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1 Introduction
There has been contrasting theoretical results on the relationship be-
tween asset ownership and investment incentives. The seminal work of
Grossman and Hart (1986) (GH, hereafter), followed by Hart and Moore
(1990), and Hart (1995), argued that asset ownership boosts incentives
to invest. De Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) (DLC, here-
after), however, have shown that in certain environments, asset owner-
ship may in fact reduce incentives to invest. This paper, in addition to
obtaining DLC result in a diﬀerent setting, presents a case where asset
ownership does not aﬀect investment incentives, despite the fact that in-
vestments are productive. It also contributes to understanding the link
between asset ownership and investment incentives by disentangling the
eﬀects of production complementarity and investment productivity.
The model draws on GH where a theory of ownership rights is de-
veloped. They consider a relationship between two firms whose pro-
ductive activities depend on each other. Ex-ante both firms make a
relationship-specific investment and, ex-post they make a decision re-
garding the production process. Due to high transaction costs, ex-ante
contracts contingent on the choice variables cannot be written. However,
once the ex-ante investments have been made, the ex-post production
decisions become contractible. Thus the agents can bargain over the
division of surplus before the production decisions are made. Owner-
ship confers residual control rights over the assets. Since none of the
variables are ex-ante contractible, the initial contract only specifies the
allocation of the residual control rights. Through its eﬀect on the use of
the asset in uncontracted states, ownership rights influence agent’s bar-
gaining power and the division of ex-post surplus, which in turn aﬀects
the parties’ incentives to invest in that relationship. If there is a mu-
tual dependence in the production of both firms, integration improves
the incentives of the new owner while it weakens the incentives of the
acquired firm’s ex-owner. This trade-oﬀ between the costs and benefits
of ownership determines the optimal allocation of control rights, hence
ownership.
The main conclusion of GH is that ownership rights should be al-
located to minimize ex-ante ineﬃciencies in production, hence assets
should be owned by the agent whose ex-ante investment is the most
productive in the relationship. This result is driven by the particular
equilibrium of the bargaining game that GH has considered. They con-
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sidered Nash bargaining where the status quo payoﬀ, which is the payoﬀ
received by an agent prior to bargaining, is treated as the disagreement
point to the Nash solution. In this paper, the Nash bargaining is re-
placed with an explicit alternating oﬀers bargaining game where status
quo payoﬀs are treated as outside options.1
The main finding of this paper is that if production complementar-
ity and investment productivity are both important in a relationship,
redistribution of ownership rights does not have eﬃciency implications.
In GH model the Coase theorem fails to apply (that is ownership mat-
ters) because of the existence of transaction costs that are created by
the agents’ opportunistic behavior during bargaining. In this paper, al-
though the agents cannot implement Pareto eﬃcient outcome through
bargaining, the ineﬃciency cannot be remedied by redistributing owner-
ship rights. This theoretical finding is also supported by empirical evi-
dence. According to Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), the non-integrated
organizational structure in steel production from steel scrap (Nucor in
U.S., and Co Steel in U.K.) is at odds with the existing property rights
theory. The relationship is characterized by significant hold-up risk, yet
it is precisely the presence of high degree of mutual dependence that
makes cooperation sustainable under non-integration.
The sensitivity of the optimal allocation of ownership rights to the
choice of extensive form bargaining game has been argued, earlier by
DLC and they have shown that asset ownership does not necessarily
boost incentive to invest. In some cases, asset ownership may act as
1As it has been previously argued in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989), and
Sutton (1986), a dynamic bargaining game diﬀerentiates between a disagreement
point and an outside option. When the status quo payoﬀs are taken as the disagree-
ment point of the Nash solution, the agent’s equilibrium payoﬀ, which is called as
the “split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ, is the sum of her status quo payoﬀ and half of the
diﬀerence between the total surplus and both agents’ status quo payoﬀs. This can
be an equilibrium of a bargaining game in which the agents receive their status quo
payoﬀs at every period where an agreement has not been reached. However, if the
agents do not receive an income flow in the course of the bargaining or there is no ex-
ogenous risk of breakdown, then the disagreement payoﬀ, which is the payoﬀ from a
perpetual negotiation without an agreement, should be zero. In this case, the agents
can obtain their status quo payoﬀ only if they quit the bargaining game unilater-
ally to implement the status quo. When the status quo payoﬀs are taken as outside
options, they determine the range of validity for the Nash solution. When neither
agents’ outside option is binding, both receive half of the total surplus, which is called
as “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. When only one agent’s outside option is binding, she
receives her outside option and the opponent claims the residual.
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"stick" rather than "carrot" in De Meza and Lockwood (1998) termi-
nology. This paper reinforces the results of DLC on the disincentive
eﬀects of asset ownership. When the production complementarity is
asymmetric, disowning an asset may increase incentives to invest in the
relationship. However, the model in this paper is based on the original
model used in GH rather than the model in Hart (1995) (which is used in
DLC) which is a special case of the former in some sense. In Hart (1995)
the ex-post production decisions are merely a decision on the choice of
the trading partner, i.e.: whether to trade with the existing partner or
outsider. Hence the right to exercise residual control rights is rather
limited.
The paper also unveils the two intertwined factors that aﬀect the
optimal distribution of ownership; investment productivity and comple-
mentarity in production. Whether an outside option is binding or not
depends on both the degree of complementarity between the ex-post
productive activities and ex-ante investment levels. If complementarity
is mutual and large then, it is more likely that ex-post renegotiation
produces a suﬃciently large surplus at almost all investment levels and
all ownership structures. In this case, neither party’s outside option
is binding and both parties gets “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. Hence, the
distribution of ownership is irrelevant. However, if the relationship is
asymmetric, in the sense that my action is significant for you but not
vice versa, it is more likely that my outside option will be binding un-
der my ownership. It is optimal to give the assets to me only if my
investment is more productive relative to your investment.2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the formal model
is introduced. In section 3, the equilibrium to the induced bargaining
subgame is derived in the case of non-integration. Section 4 contains the
equilibrium of the investment-choice game in the case of non-integration.
Section 5 considers integration, in particular the case in which firm 1
owns firm 2 is analyzed. In Section 6, contains the comparative statics
with respect to the level of complementarity between the two firm, in
2The distinct eﬀects of investment productivity and production complementarity
on determination of optimal asset ownership cannot be separated in the De Meza
and Lockwood (1998) model but rather their combined aﬀect is represented by as-
sets being productive or unproductive outside relationship. This is because, in their
model, the ex-post production decision is reduced down to the choice of trading part-
ner, inside or outside. However, in many situation ex-post production may involve
complex design decisions that are not contractible ex-ante.
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order to characterize when the equilibrium exist. In Section 7, the two
ownership structures are compared and the relationship between asset
ownership and investment incentives is discussed. Section 8 contains
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
As in the GH model, there are two firms, 1 and 2, that are engaged
in a relationship which lasts 2 periods. Each firm is managed by an
agent who receives the full return of the firm where she is employed. At
the beginning of date 1, the two agents sign a contract that specifies
the distribution of ownership rights over each firm’s assets. After the
contract is signed, each agent makes a relationship-specific investment
ai ∈ Ai ⊂ R+. We assume that the relationship-specific investments
require special skills so that the investment ai in firm i can only be
made by agent i. At date 2, the investments become observable to both
agents and some further decisions regarding the production process are
made. Let qi ∈ Qi ⊂ R+ denote ex-post decision of agent i = 1, 2.
Although ai is chosen by agent i, the ex-post decision, qi, is made by
the agent who owns firm i.3 The private benefit to agent i is written
as Bi[ai, φi(q1, q2)]. The function φi can be thought of as a monetary
payoﬀ from second stage production net of costs. There is a disutility
associated with ex-ante investment, which is given by vi(ai). All costs
and benefits are measured in date 1 dollars. The benefits and costs are
the same under any ownership structure. Moreover, ownership does not
provide any additional benefit.
None of the variables ai, qi and Bi (·) is contractible ex-ante. It is
assumed that the non-contractibility of the variables arises either as a re-
sult of high transaction costs associated with writing comprehensive con-
tracts, or because of enforcement problems. The ex-ante investment, ai,
is regarded as non-verifiable managerial eﬀort which is non-contractible
because of the enforcement problem. The variable qi is ex-ante non-
contractible because it stands for complex production decision and it is
diﬃcult to describe ex-ante.
3If the firms are separately owned, that is if agent i owns firm i, each agent is
an owner-manager who has residual control rights over her firm’s physical assets, so
agent i chooses ai and qi of firm i. If the firms are integrated under i’s ownership then
agent i owns both firms 1 and 2 and agent j becomes her employee. For example,
under 1’s ownership, agent 1 chooses a1, q1 and q2 and agent 2 chooses a2.
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Since the decision variables are ex-ante non-contractible, the date
0 contract can only allocate ownership rights between the two agent.
Ownership of an asset grants the beholder the right to use it in any way
she desires unless these rights are contracted away.4
A summary of the sequence of events is as follows. At date 0, a
contract is signed. After that, a1 and a2 are chosen simultaneously and
independently. At date 1, each agent learns the amount invested by
her opponent. Before the actual choices of qi are made they become
contractible. If there is no further negotiation, the agent who owns
firm i chooses qi independently. The second stage decision, q = (q1, q2),
however, becomes contractible at date 1. Thus, a new contract may be
negotiated that implements diﬀerent choices of q1 and q2, and specifies
how the surplus is divided. Then B1 (·) and B2 (·) are realized and the
necessary transfers are made between the two agents according to the
new contract.
The following technical assumptions guarantee that the optimization
problems have unique solutions and first-order necessary conditions are
suﬃcient. It is assumed that Bi (·) and vi (·) are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and satisfy the following assumptions for all ai ∈ Ai and
qi ∈ Qi.
Assumption 1: Bi (·) is increasing in φi and ai. B1 [·]+B2 [·] is strictly
concave in its four arguments, (a1, a2, q1, q2).
Assumption 2: The cost function vi (ai) is increasing and convex in
ai.
Assuming that monetary transfers between agents are available, the
optimal contract maximizes the total ex-ante net benefits of the two
agents,
W = B1 [a1, φ1 (q1, q2)] +B2 [a2, φ2 (q1, q2)]− v1 (a1)− v2 (a2) . (1)
If a1 and a2 were verifiable, and q1 and q2 were ex-ante contractible, the
first best solution which is obtained by maximizing (1) with respect to
ai and qi for i = 1, 2, could have been implemented. Since it is assumed
4Note that in this model, financial returns are not transferable with ownership.
Ownership, however, can also be identified with the rights to the residual income
stream. Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) argued that the definition of ownership can
be a critical element in analyzing the eﬃciency properties of the initial allocation of
ownership rights.
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that all date 1 variables are non-contractible as of date 0, the first-best
cannot be implemented. There are three cases to consider. In the first
case which is called non-integration, the firms are separately owned. In
the second and third cases the firms are integrated under the ownership
of a single agent, 1 and 2 respectively.5
3 Non-integration
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game is characterized
by a vector of (a, q) ∈ A×Q and transfer payments, where a = (a1, a2) ,
q = (q1, q2) , A = A1 × A2 and Q = Q1 × Q2. Each vector a induces
a proper subgame where agent 1 and 2 bargain over the division of
total surplus. These subgames are called as the induced bargaining
subgames. Below, the equilibrium payoﬀs in these bargaining subgames
are characterized.
In the case where the firms are separately owned, agent i has the
right to choose qi. At date 1, the two agents choose q1 and q2 to maxi-
mize B1 [a1, φ1 (q1, q2)] and B2 [a2, φ2 (q1, q2)], respectively. It is assumed
that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium to the simultaneous q-choice
subgame which is
qˆ1 = arg max
q1∈Q1
φ1(q1, qˆ2),
qˆ2 = arg max
q2∈Q2
φ2(qˆ1, q2).
(2)
In general, the non-cooperative solution (qˆ1, qˆ2) is ex-post ineﬃcient.6
Therefore the two parties can gain from negotiating a new contract that
specifies (q1 (a) , q2 (a)) as the actions to be taken, where
(q1(a), q2(a)) = argmax {B1 [a1, φ1 (q1, q2)] +B2 [a2, φ2 (q1, q2)]} (3)
is the equilibrium of the cooperative q-choice subgame. The vector of
equilibrium actions (q1 (a) , q2 (a)) is unique given that B1 (·) + B2 (·)
function is concave. The new contract is feasible, since q1 and q2 are ex-
post contractible. Let B[a, q(a)] denote the value function of problem
3. The division of B[a, q(a)] among the two agents is determined by an
alternating oﬀers bargaining game.
5Ownership is perceived as a discrete variable which takes the value either 0 or 1
for each agent. Either agent 1 or agent 2 owns the firm. Two agent cannot own the
same firm at the same time. Therefore a joint ownership structure is not considered.
6The noncooperative choices are eﬃcient when φi is a function of only qi or when
φi = φj , that is the both agents have the same payoﬀ function.
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In the GH model the solution to the contract negotiation is charac-
terized by the Nash bargaining solution where the status quo payoﬀs are
treated as disagreement payoﬀs. In the unique equilibrium outcome of
this bargaining game, each agent receives half of the increase in the total
surplus which is written as
Bi = 1
2
h
B [a, q (a)]−Bi(ai, φˆi)−Bj(aj, φˆj)
i
(4)
where φˆi = φi (qˆ1, qˆ2) , and Bi(ai, φˆi) is the status quo payoﬀ of agent i
under non-integration, i = 1, 2. If one considers a bargaining game where
the agents do not receive any income flow until they reach an agreement
or there is no exogenous risk of breakdown then it is more natural to
treat the status quo payoﬀs as outside options.7 While a disagreement
payoﬀ directly influence the division of the surplus in the equilibrium,
an outside option influences the division of the surplus only when it is
a credible threat. Outside option constitutes a credible threat only if a
player obtains a higher payoﬀ from exercising her outside option than
the equilibrium payoﬀ she receives when she continues to bargain. Oth-
erwise, quitting is not a credible threat. In the former case, she should
at least receive the value of her outside option in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the bargaining game. In the latter case, her outside option
does not influence the equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 1 Given the initial ownership structure, and the vector a =
(a1, a2) of of ex-ante investment levels, the induced bargaining subgame
has a unique equilibrium in which the agreement is reached immediately,
and firm 1 receives p, given by
p =
⎧
⎨
⎩
B [a, q (a)] if B1(a1, φˆ1), B2(a2, φˆ2) ≤ B [a, q (a)] /2
B1(a1, φˆ1) if B1(a1, φˆ1) > B [a, q (a)] /2
B [a, q (a)]−B2(a2, φˆ2) otherwise.
Proof. See Shaked and Sutton (1984).
When both outside options are small relative to the “split-the-surplus”
solution, as in the first case, both agents prefer to continue bargaining
than quitting. This would generally be the case when the surplus created
7The term outside option does not imply the party’s payoﬀ from engaging with a
third party. It is the payoﬀ available to the party outside the bargaining game.
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by cooperation is large. In the second case agent 1 quits because she
receives greater payoﬀ in the status quo than if they split the surplus. In
the third case, agent 2 prefers quitting. When agent 1’s outside option
is binding, agent 2’s outside option cannot be binding. This contradicts
with the assumption that cooperation generates greater surplus.
Note that, as opposed to GH’s “split-the-diﬀerence” solution, the
outside option has no eﬀect on the bargaining outcome if it does not
constitute a credible threat. Since the analysis of optimal allocation of
ownership rights heavily depends on the outcome of the negotiation, the
way the status quo payoﬀ is incorporated into the model is critical.
Given the initial ownership structure and the ex-ante choice of (a1, a2),
let Πi (a1, a2) denote the overall payoﬀ to agent i obtained from the in-
duced bargaining subgame. In the rest of the paper, the game will be
analyzed from agent i’s perspective, where j denotes the opponent. Let
Hi (a1, a2) = B [a, q (a)]−Bj(aj, φˆj) (5)
be the agent i’s residual payoﬀ after paying the agent j the value of her
outside option, and
Ci (a1, a2) = B [a, q (a)] /2 (6)
as agent i’s share in the "split-the-surplus" solution. Then, using Lemma
1 we obtain agent i’s reduced form payoﬀ from the bargaining subgame
as
Πi (a1, a2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Hi (a1, a2)− vi (ai) if j’s o. o. is binding,
Ci (a1, a2)− vi (ai) if neither o. o. are binding,
Bi(ai, φˆi)− vi (ai) if i’s o. o. is binding.
(7)
There is a qualitative diﬀerence in the way the ex-ante investments
aﬀect the payoﬀs of the parties in this model compared to the GHmodel.
In the GH model, the two agent receives the “split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ
in the equilibrium, and as the opponent’s action changes agent i responds
by maximizing the “split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ. In this model, the op-
ponent’s investment first determines the payoﬀ function that agent i is
facing. Then it influences the value of this function. Note that the op-
ponent’s investment does not aﬀect the value of agent i’s outside option
because the second period payoﬀ φˆi is independent of ex-ante investment
choices of both agents. Fix an aj, such that agent i’s outside option
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gives her the highest payoﬀ. As the opponent’s investment is increased,
agent i’s response remains constant until the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ
becomes equal the value of her outside option. At this point, agent i is
indiﬀerent between maximizing the value of her outside option and the
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. As the opponent’s investment continues to
increase it becomes more profitable for agent i to maximize the “split-
the-surplus” payoﬀ until the region where the opponent’s outside option
is binding is reached. From this point on, the agent responds by maxi-
mizing the residual payoﬀ. It is worth to note that the status quo payoﬀs
do not aﬀect the agents’ payoﬀs when neither of the firm’s outside option
is binding because both receive the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. On the
other hand, in a region where the opponent’s outside option is binding,
the status quo payoﬀ both influences the level of payoﬀ agent i receives
and constrains the validity of the payoﬀ function.
In finding the agents’ response functions, first the three regions of
interest in Πi (a1, a2) as a function of a is characterized. However, in
doing that I assume that firms are symmetric in order to simplify the
calculations.
Lemma 2 If Ci (0, 0) > Bi(0, φˆi) and
maxφi ∂Bi (ai, φi) /∂ai < 2minφi ∂Bi (ai, φi) /∂ai for every ai ∈ Ai, then
there exists a monotonically increasing function αi : Aj → Ai such that
i. j’s outside option is binding if ai ≤ α−1j (aj) ,
ii. neither outside option is binding if α−1j (aj) < ai ≤ αi (aj) ,
iii. i’s outside option is binding if αi (aj) < ai.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first assumption of the Lemma 2 is automatically satisfied when
the firms are symmetric. Otherwise, cooperation generates a smaller
total surplus than non-cooperation. The second assumption requires
that the marginal benefit from ai does not change much with φi. In
other words, the marginal private benefit of ex-ante investment must
not be very sensitive to the second period payoﬀ.
The α function divides the (a1, a2) plane into three regions. In the
northwest corner, agent 1’s outside option is binding, in the southeast
corner, agent 2’s outside option is binding and in the between region,
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neither agent’s outside option is binding. On the 45◦ line both agents
invest the same amount, a1 = a2. Given that they are symmetric, the
non-cooperative choices of q’s will be the same, so will be the value of
the status quo payoﬀs. If agent 1’s outside option is binding then agent
2’s outside option has to be binding because of symmetry. Both outside
option, however, cannot be binding at the same time. Therefore, on the
45◦ line neither outside option is binding. Now consider keeping a2 at the
same level as before but increasing a1. Since B1 (·) is increasing in a1, if
a1 is increased enough we reach to a point where agent 1’s outside option
is just binding. That’s why the region where agent 1’s outside option is
binding should be on the northwest corner. The similar argument applies
for agent 2; the region where her outside option is binding should be on
the southeast corner. Thus, we have
Claim 3 αi (aj) > ai. The area in which agent i’s outside option is
binding always lies above 45◦ line.
4 Equilibria to the investment-choice game
The ex-ante investments a1 and a2 are chosen simultaneously and inde-
pendently at date 0 taking into account the outcome of the negotiation
between agents 1 and 2. A perfect subgame Nash equilibrium in date 0
investments is a pair
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
∈ A1 ×A2 such that
Π1
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
≥ Π1
¡
a1, aN2
¢
for all a1 ∈ A1,
Π1
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
≥ Π1
¡
aN1 , a2
¢
for all a2 ∈ A2.
(8)
Define ρi : Aj → Ai to be agent i’s response function, where
ρi (aj) = arg maxai∈Ai
Πi (a1, a2) . (9)
Before deriving the agents’ response functions, some further assumptions
are introduced into the model.
Assumption 3: φi is increasing in qj. q1 and q2 are complementary
activities.
Assumption 4: The marginal benefit of ai is increasing in second
period payoﬀ, φi.
Since Πi (a1, a2) depends on the region of choice space considered,
it is convenient to separately analyze these regions, find the optimal
action in each, and then determine the optimal action which maximizes
the overall payoﬀ.
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Agent i’s best response when her outside option is binding :
Let the best response function of agent i in the region where her outside
option is binding be defined as
βi (aj) = max {aˆi, αi (aj)} . (10)
Here aˆi is agent i’s optimal investment choice when the initial contract
is not renegotiated:
aˆi = arg max
ai∈Ai
n
Bi(ai, φˆi)− vi (ai)
o
. (11)
Let aj ∈ Aj be defined as, αi (aj) = aˆi, i.e.: the level of ex-ante
investment made by agent j so that agent i’s outside option is just
binding at its optimum. It is assumed that aˆi > αi (0) so that there
indeed exists an aj > 0. Now βi (aj) is rewritten as
βi (aj) =
½
aˆi if aj ≤ aj
αi (aj) if aj > aj.
(12)
Agent i’s best response when neither outside option is binding :
Let the best response function of agent i where neither agent’s outside
option is binding be defined as
ηi (aj) = argmax
α−1j (aj)<ai≤αi(aj)
{Ci (a1, a2)− vi (ai)} . (13)
In this case, the agents share the total surplus, thus agent i maximizes
half of the surplus net of cost of ex-ante investment. We define
δi (aj) = arg max
ai∈Ai
{Ci (a1, a2)− vi (ai)} (14)
as the i’s best response to the unconstrained maximization problem. By
applying the implicit function theorem it can easily be shown that
Claim 4 If ∂qi (ai) /∂aj > 0 for i, j = 1, 2, then δi (aj) is increasing in
aj.
Next, using the definition of δi (aj) and the second assumption in
Lemma 2, it can easily be shown that the best response to the “split-
the-surplus” payoﬀ is always smaller than the best response to the status
quo payoﬀ.
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Claim 5 δi (aj) < aˆi for all aj.
Essentially, ex-ante investment, ai, increases the value of the second
period payoﬀ, φi. When the agent receives the status quo payoﬀ she
obtains the full benefit of her actions so she has greater incentive to
invest than when she receives half of the total surplus.
Next, the critical values of aj within which δi (aj) is the relevant
response function is defined. Let a0j ∈ Aj such that δi(a0j) = αi(a0j),
and a00j ∈ Aj such that δi(a00j ) = α−1j (a00j ). That is, a0j is the level of ex-
ante investment of agent j where agent i’s outside option is just binding
when she maximizes the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. It is assumed that
δi (0) > αi (0) so that there exists a0j. The critical value a00j is the level of
ex-ante investment of agent j at which her outside option is just binding
when agent i maximizes the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ.
Finally, agent i’s best response when neither outside option is binding
is written as
ηi (aj) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
αi (aj) if aj > a0j,
δi (aj) if a0j ≤ aj ≤ a00j ,
α−1j (aj) if a
00
j ≤ aj.
(15)
Agent i’s best response when opponent’s outside option is bind-
ing: Let the best response function of agent i in the region where agent
j’s outside option binds be defined as
ξi (aj) = arg max
α−1j (aj)≥ai
{Hi (a1, a2)− vi (ai)} . (16)
Agent i’s outside option does not bind whenever agent j’s outside option
binds. Agent i claims the residual and chooses ai to maximize the total
surplus net of the cost of ex-ante investment and the payment to the
agent j. Let i (aj) be the maximizer of the unconstrained problem
where
i (aj) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Hi (a1, a2)− vi (ai) . (17)
By applying the implicit function theorem it can easily be shown that
Claim 6 i (aj) is increasing in aj.
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Let eaj ∈ Aj such that α−1j (eaj) = i (eaj). Here a˜j is the level of ex-ante
investment of agent j at which her outside option just binds when agent
i maximizes the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. Hence, agent i’s response
function when agent j’s outside option is binding can be written as
ξi (aj) =
½
α−1j (aj) if aj > eaj ,
i (aj) if aj < eaj . (18)
Agent i’s best response function: Now we evaluate the payoﬀ func-
tion Πi (a1, a2) at the optimum of each region and compare them to find
the best response function of agent i. From claim 5, aˆi > δi (aj) for all
aj. Since the function Ci (ai, aj)−vi (ai) reaches its maximum at δi (aj),
it must be decreasing for all ai > δi (aj), so it is for aˆi. This implies that,
when agent j invests at aj, the value of agent i’s “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ
at its maximum, Ci (δi (aj) , aj)− vi (δi (aj)), is higher than the value of
her outside option at its maximum, Bi(aˆi, φˆi)−vi (aˆi). Since Ci (·)−vi (·)
is increasing in aj, there exists a level of ex-ante investment, say aˇj, which
is lower than aj and at aˇj agent i is indiﬀerent between choosing aˆi or
δi (aj) , i.e.: Ci (δi (aˇj) , aˇj)− vi (δi (aˇj)) = Bi(aˆi, φˆi)− vi (aˆi) .
We next need to locate aˇj. Below it is shown that the jump in agent
i’s response function occurs at the region where her outside option is not
binding.
Claim 7 a0j < aˇj.8
Claim 7 says that when agent j’s investment is small, agent i can
obtain a higher payoﬀ in status quo than the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ
by investing at high levels. However, as agent j’s investment increases,
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ increases because of the complementarity as-
sumption and generates higher payoﬀs than the status quo payoﬀ. There-
fore, for small levels of aj, agent i continues to choose aˆi even though
her outside option is not binding.
Whether aˇj is greater or smaller than a00j depends on the gains from
cooperation. Recall a00j is the point where agent j’s outside option is just
8Since aˆi is greater than δi (aj) for all aj by claim 5, δi (aj) can only be equal
to αi (aj) when Bi(ai, φˆi) − vi (ai) is increasing. This means that Ci(δi(a0j), a0j) −
vi(δi(a0j)) is less than Bi(aˆi, φˆi)−vi (aˆi). In order to increase the value of Ci (·)−vi (·)
to be equal to Bi(aˆi, φˆi)− vi (aˆi), aj has to increase. Thus, a0j < aˇj .
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binding when agent i chooses δi (aj). If aˇj is smaller than a00j , then agent
i responds by choosing along δi (aj) for aj ∈
£
aˇj, a00j
¤
. If aˇj is greater than
a00j and agent i responds with δi (aj), agent j’s outside option becomes
binding that implies that agent i does not receive the “split-the-surplus”
payoﬀ but claims the residual. In fact, she maximizes her payoﬀ if she
continues to choose aˆi for values of aj < a∗j , where a∗j is implicitly defined
as Ci(α−1j (a
∗
j), a∗j)−vi(δi(a∗j)) = Bi(aˆi, φˆi)−vi (aˆi). For any value aj ≥ a∗j ,
agent i responds by maximizing the residual, Hi (·)− vi (·).
Before agent i’s response function is presented it is important to note
that both aˇj and a∗j are smaller than aj.
Claim 8 aˇj < aj and a∗j < aj.
The above analysis is summarized in the following lemma that de-
scribes agent i’s response function.
Lemma 9 If aˇj < a00j , then agent i’s response function is
ρi (aj) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
aˆi if aj ≤ aˇj,
δi (aj) if aˇj < aj ≤ a00j ,
α−1j (aj) if a
00
j < aj ≤ eaj,
i (aj) if eaj < aj.
If aˇj ≥ a00j then agent i’s response function is
ρi (aj) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
aˆi if aj ≤ a∗j ,
α−1j (aj) if a
∗
j < aj ≤ eaj,
i (aj) if eaj < aj.
Agent i can have two types of response function depending on whether
or not she switches from maximizing the status quo payoﬀ to maximizing
the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ in the region where the opponent’s outside
option is binding. If aˇj < a00j , then the jump in the response function
occurs in the region where agent j’s outside option is not binding. For
small aj, agent i chooses aˆi. At aˇj there is a downward jump in the re-
sponse function. From this point on, agent i chooses along δi (aj) until
a00j is reached. At a00j , agent j’s outside option becomes binding. Agent
i responds by choosing along α−1j (aj) so that agent j’s outside option
just binds. After eaj is reached, agent i responds by choosing i (aj).
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If aˇj ≥ a00j , that is, when the jump occurs in the region where agent
j’s outside option is binding, agent i chooses aˆi for small aj. For aj ∈£
a∗j ,eaj¤ , she responds along α−1j (aj) so that agent j’s outside option is
just binding. For aj > eaj, she responds along i (aj). Whether aˇj is
smaller or greater than a00j depends on the B and v functions.
In general, the game will have either a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in which both agents maximize the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ
(if aˇj < δi (aˇj)) or no pure strategy equilibrium (if aˇj > δi (aˇj)). The
following proposition describes the equilibrium of the investment-choice
game.
Proposition 10 If there exists a Nash equilibrium to the investment-
choice game in which neither agent’s outside option is binding, then it
is the unique equilibrium (in pure strategies).
Proof. Let
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
be the Nash equilibrium in which neither agent’s
outside option is binding. First I show that regardless of the existence
of
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
, (δi (aˆj) , aˆj) and
¡
α−1j (aˆj) , aˆj
¢
cannot be equilibria. Since
aj > aˇj, it is also true by symmetry that ai > aˇi. This implies that
agent j switches to δj (ai) at some investment level, ai, which is be-
low ai. Therefore, α−1j (aj) never intersects the response function at
aˆj. Moreover, δj (ai) is part of the response function when it is above
α−1j (aj). Since aˆj < α
−1
j (aˆj), then aˆj < δi (aˆj). Thus, (δi (aˆj) , aˆj) can
never be an equilibrium, either. Given that
¡
aN1 , aN2
¢
is the Nash equilib-
rium of the game, it must be true that aˇi < δi (aˇj) < δi (aˆj) since δi (aj)
is monotonically increasing in aj. It is also true that δi (aˆj) < i (aˆj)
which in turn implies that aˆj < i (aˆj). Thus, (i (aˆj) , aˆj) cannot be an
equilibrium.
The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium depends on the positive slope
of the δi (·) function which arises from the complementarity assumption
(Assumption 3). As aj increases, there is a direct eﬀect on Ci, but also an
indirect eﬀect since the second period payoﬀ to both firms, φi, increases
in response to the increase in aj. The increase in φi, in return, causes ai
to increase.
Proposition 10 refers to the uniqueness, but not the existence of the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The existence of the equilibrium will
be studied in Section 6.
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5 Integration (1’s Ownership)
I consider only agent 1’s ownership under integration since the case for
agent 2’s ownership is symmetric. Under agent 1’s ownership, agent 1
owns both firms and agent 2 becomes her employee. In our model, this
amounts to agent 1 choosing both q1 and q2 at date 1. It is, however, still
necessary that both agents make the relationship-specific investment at
date 0.
Besides having the right to choose both q1 and q2 at date 1, agent 1
is also the only agent in the bargaining game who can credibly use her
outside option. The residual control rights give her the right to both
choose and implement q1 and q2. Agent 2 can bribe agent 1 to choose
his favorite q but he cannot quit the bargaining game and implement
the status quo choices of q1 and q2.
At date 1, agent 1 chooses q1 and q2 to maximize B1 [a1, φ1 (q1, q2)]. It
is assumed that there exists a unique equilibrium to the q-choice subgame
under 1’s ownership. Let
(qˆ11, qˆ12) = arg max
q1∈Q1
q2∈Q2
φ1 (q1, q2) (19)
be the unique Nash equilibrium to this game. In general, the non-
cooperative solution (qˆ11, qˆ12) is ex-post ineﬃcient.9 Therefore, the two
parties can gain from negotiating a new contract. The rest of the analy-
sis is similar to the case of non-integration. The payoﬀ function for agent
1 is given by
Π1 (a1, a2) =
(
C1 (a1, a2)− v1 (a1) if neither o. o. is binding,
B1
³
a1, φˆ11
´
− v1 (a1) if 1’s o. o. is binding,
(20)
and for agent 2 it is
Π2 (a1, a2) =
½
C2 (a1, a2)− v2 (a2) if neither o. o. is binding,
H2 (a1, a2)− v2 (a2) if 1’s o. o. is binding.
(21)
The assumptions of Lemma 2 are suﬃcient to prove the existence of
α11 (a2) which divides the space of (a1, a2) into two regions such that,
for a1 > α11 (a2) agent 1’s outside option is binding and a1 < α11 (a2)
it is not binding. The following lemma describes the agents’ response
functions under agent 1’s ownership.
9A variable with subscript ki denotes the choice of agent i under k’s ownership.
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Lemma 11 Agent 1’s response function is
ρ11 (a2) =
½
aˆ11 if a2 ≤ aˇ12,
δ11 (a2) if aˇ12 < a2.
Agent 2’s response function is
ρ12 (a1) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
δ12 (a1) if a2 ≤ a0011,
α−111 (a1) if a0011 < a2 ≤ ea11,
12 (a1) if ea11 < a2.
Proof. See Proof of Lemma 9.
Under 1’s ownership, both agents have a unique response function
for any parameter values. This is because the agent 2’s outside option is
never binding. The jump in the response function always occurs at aˇ12.
As in the case of non-integration the game has either a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in which both agents maximize the “split-the-
surplus” payoﬀ or no equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique Nash
equilibrium exists if aˇ12 < δ11 (aˇ12), that is, if the jump in agent 1’s
response function occurs to the left of 45◦ line. An argument similar to
that used in the proof of proposition 10 shows that if there exists a Nash
equilibrium to the investment-choice game in which neither agent’s out-
side option is binding, then it is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
6 On the Existence of the Equilibrium
It is apparent that the divergence between the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria is completely driven by the interdependency in
the second period production. The extent to which total surplus can be
increased through negotiation depends on the degree of complementarity.
Let γ be an index of complementarity where γ ∈ [0, 1]. When γ =
0 there is no production complementarity. In that case, the second
period payoﬀ function φi depends solely on qi. As γ increases the degree
of complementarity in the production of the two firms increases. The
following assumptions are made:
Assumption 5: ∂qi (a) /∂γ > 0 for i = 1, 2. The cooperative choice
of ex-post production increases as complementarity increases.
Assumption 6: ∂Bi(ai, φˆi)/∂γ < ∂Ci (a1, a2) /∂γ, i.e., as the com-
plementarity between the two firm’s production increases the “split-the-
surplus” payoﬀ increases by more than the non-cooperative payoﬀ.
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Assume that γ = 0. Then the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative
choices of qi are the same and in both cases the value of the second pe-
riod payoﬀ, φˆi and φ
c
i are identical. As a result, regardless of whether or
not she cooperates, the payoﬀ to agent i when she claims the residual is
the same as the status quo payoﬀ. Thus, Hi (·) = Bi(ai, φˆi), and they are
maximized at the same level of ex-ante investment, aˆi = i > δi. Even
though δi is independent of the opponent’s ex-ante investment level, it is
still lower than aˆi since in the “split-the-surplus” solution the agent does
not receive the full benefit of her actions. In this non-complementarity
case, αi (aj) = α−1j (aj) = aj, which implies that agent i’s outside option
is binding in the area above 45◦ line while agent j’s is binding below.
In other words there is no region in which neither of the agents’ outside
option is binding. Below the equilibrium to this game is characterized.
Lemma 12 If there is no complementarity between the two firms’ pro-
duction then (aˆ1, aˆ2) is the unique equilibrium of the above game.10
As complementarity is introduced, that is γ > 0, all the relevant
functions and critical points in the response function change. By using
the implicit function theorem it is easy to prove that aˆi, δi (aj), αi (aj),
and i (aj) increase as γ increases. This implies that there exists an area
in which neither agents’ outside option is binding.
For low levels of complementarity it is argued that there is no equilib-
rium in pure strategies. When γ is zero, a00i is smaller than aˇi. Thus, for a
small degree of complementarity a00i is still smaller than aˇi by continuity
and the relevant response function is the second response function given
in Lemma 9. With this response function, the only possible equilibrium
is the one in which neither parties’ outside option is binding.
10Note that ai = aˆi by the fact that αi (aj) is the 45◦ line and by the definition of
ai. In claim 8 we have shown that aˇj < aj . Thus it follows that, aˇj < aˆj . To show
that aˇi > δi, consider the opposite, that is aˇi ≤ δi. Then since αi (ai) = ai in the
case of no complementarity, it follows that Bi(aˇi, φˆi)− vi (aˇi) = Ci (aˇi, aˇj)− v1 (aˇi).
By the single crossing property in lemma 2, Ci (ai, aˇj)− v1 (ai) ≤ Bi(ai, φˆi)− v1 (ai)
for all ai ≥ aˇi. Hence Ci (δi, aˇj)− v1 (δi) ≤ Bi(δi, bφi)− v1 (δi) < Bi(aˆi, bφi)− vi (aˆi),
which contradicts with the definition of aˇi. Therefore it must be true that aˇi > δi.
Given that aˇj is in the region where the opponent’s outside option is binding, the
jump must occur at a∗j . a
∗
j is equal to baj because of the fact that Hi (·) = Bi(ai, bφi).
The best response of agent i is to always play bai. In fact the jump in the response
function is fictitious. Because of symmetry bai intersects 45◦ line at baj , so we have
an equilibrium.
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Proposition 13 For low levels of complementarity, there is no equilib-
rium to the investment-choice game in pure strategies. If the complemen-
tarity between the two firm is suﬃciently large, then there is a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In the case where there is no complementarity, γ = 0, the
equilibrium to this game is (aˆ1, aˆ2). Now suppose that the agents are
forced to receive the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. The unique equilibrium
of this forced game is (δ1, δ2). Let Ai be the payoﬀ to agent i in this
forced equilibrium and Bi be the payoﬀ to agent i from deviating to a
point which enforces outside option. Bi is greater than Ai since Bi (·)
is increasing in ai and aˆi > δi. When the complementarity is small, an
interior equilibrium, if it exists, has to be close to the equilibrium of the
forced division game when there is no complementarity.11 Let Ci denote
the payoﬀ to agent i in an equilibrium where both agents receive the
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ when γ > 0. Finally let Di denote the payoﬀ
to agent i from deviating to a point which enforces outside option. We
know that Bi is greater than Ai. Ai is close to Ci and Bi is close to
Diwhich implies that Di is greater than Ci. This implies that agent i has
an incentive to deviate from the (δ1, δ2) equilibrium when there is small
a complementarity. Therefore (δ1, δ2) cannot be an equilibrium. There
also cannot be an equilibrium where both agents’ outside option are
binding. Therefore there is no equilibrium when the firms’ production
exhibits small complementarity. The second part of the lemma is proved
in Proposition 10.
The intuition behind proposition 13 is the following. When the agent
receives the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ, her incentives are distorted down-
wards. If we keep the opponent’s action fixed, it is profitable for the
agent to deviate and choose aˆi to maximize the status quo payoﬀ. This
is true for both agents because of symmetry. There cannot, however, be
an equilibrium where both agents’ outside options are binding. In fact,
the only case when there is an equilibrium where both outside option
are binding is when there is no complementarity between the two firms.
As complementarity increases, the agents’ outside options become non-
binding, so the deviations described above do not occur. Then the game
has the unique equilibrium where neither of the agents’ outside options
are binding.
11It follows from that the response function has a closed graph.
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7 Asset Ownership and Incentives to Invest
When firms are symmetric, the equilibrium to the investment-choice
game, provided that it exists, is identical under the two ownership struc-
ture. Since the same equilibrium is obtained regardless of the initial
distribution of the ownership rights, asset ownership does not aﬀect the
incentives to invest. Investments are ineﬃcient, however, this ineﬃciency
cannot be remedied by reallocating the ownership rights.
Now I consider cases where firms are asymmetric. As a benchmark,
consider a relationship where φi only depends on qi for i = 1, 2, which
corresponds to the case of γ = 0 in Section 6. Under non-integration,
there is no room for negotiation since the non-cooperative choice of q is
identical to cooperative choice. Hence, ex-ante investments are eﬃcient.
Under 1’s ownership qˆ1 = qc1 while qˆ2 6= qc2. Then, 1’s outside option
is binding whenever B2 (a2, φc2) > B1 (a1, φ
c
1) .12 Note that 2’s outside
option is never binding since she cannot credibly exercise it. Depending
on the relative magnitudes of φc2 and φ
c
1, and the marginal productivity
of investment of both agents, we can have diﬀerent kinds of equilibria,
including the eﬃcient one.
Next consider an asymmetric case where φ1 depends only on q1 and
φ2 depends on both q1 and q2. The cooperative choices of q will diﬀer
from non-cooperative choices in all ownership structures, hence there will
be room for negotiation. The optimal allocation of ownership is the one
that results with less distortion in ex-ante investments. Recall that if an
agent becomes a residual claimant in an equilibrium then her investment
will be eﬃcient. Hence the ownership should be allocated to make the
agent with higher marginal productivity of investment residual claimant
in order to minimize the distortion in ex-ante investments. Ownership
increases one’s bargaining power by giving her residual control rights
which in turn allows her to credibly exercise its outside option. But it
also makes the level of outside option larger hence makes it more likely to
bind. Therefore, similar to the conclusions of DLC, disowning an asset
may increase the incentives to invest in a relationship in this model as
well.
The distinct roles played by production complementarity (∂φi/∂qj)
and marginal productivity of ex-ante investment (∂2Bi/∂ai∂φi) in de-
termining the optimal ownership structure should be stressed. Both
12It follows from the fact that φˆi = φ
c
i .
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the asset ownership, through its incentive eﬀects, and the production
complementarity determine the level of quasi rents in a relationship and
whether outside option is binding or not.13 If production complementar-
ity is not significant then the initial distribution of asset ownership does
not change the outcome of ex-post bargaining significantly. However, if
production complementarity is important, then ex-post negotiation may
improve the surplus created. It is then the initial allocation of ownership
that determines the magnitude of the improvement and whether outside
option are binding or not. If the degree of complementarity is high and
mutual then we have the Coasean result that predicts the irrelevance of
the ownership structure. If the degree of complementarity is high but
asymmetric then there may be cases in which asset ownership may in
fact distort incentives to invest. Hence it is optimal to take away as-
sets from the agent who is significant in the relationship (in the sense of
having high marginal productivity).
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the role of the initial allocation of ownership rights
in transactions where parties make relationship-specific investments and
contracts are incomplete. Two ownership structures are compared; non-
integration and 1’s ownership. In both cases, when firms are symmetric
and the degree of complementarity between the two firms’ production is
high, cooperation generates large surplus. In these cases, the investment-
choice game has a unique Nash equilibrium where neither agents’ outside
option is binding. Since the same equilibrium is obtained regardless of
the ownership structure, the distortions in the ex-ante investments are
independent of the initial allocation of ownership rights. If, however,
the degree of complementarity between the two firms’ production is low,
then the equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
When complementarity between firms is asymmetric, it is found that,
as in DLC, there may be cases where taking away the assets from signif-
icant partner may boosts her incentives to invest. By removing an asset,
13This observation blurs the sharp contrast between property rights theory and
transaction cost theory which was sussinctly put forward by Whinston (2001). He
states that the likelihood of integration in property rights theory depends on marginal
returns to investment while in transaction cost theory it is levels of quasi rents that
matter for integration decisions. In my model the likelihood of integration not only
depends on marginal returns to investment but also levels of quasi-rents.
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bargaining power of the significant player is reduced while the bargaining
power of the insignificant one is increased, hence the significant player
becomes residual claimant and her ex-ante investment is less distorted.
The main conclusion of the paper, which states that the allocation
of initial ownership rights is irrelevant, partially extends the Coase the-
orem to the relationships in which agents are unable to bargain ex-ante
over all aspects of the transaction, due to contractual incompleteness.
This irrelevance result also contrasts the findings of earlier studies in
property rights theory where the initial allocation ownership rights have
eﬃciency implications. Sustaining cooperation in highly dependent ver-
tical structures without resorting vertical integration is empirically ob-
served.14 Moreover, this finding can guide privatization policies towards
unbundling the vertical structures such as vertical components of public
utilities where hold up risk can be significant.
An implicit assumption in this model is regarding the definition of
ownership. Following GH, ownership is defined as the power to exer-
cise control. It would be interesting to examine whether the irrelevance
result continue to hold if the definition of ownership is broaden to in-
clude the rights to the residual income stream. Another assumption in
the model is that the relationship lasts only two periods. If, however,
the relationship lasts longer and the bargaining takes place concurrently
with the production, results may diﬀer. In this case, the status quo pay-
oﬀs become the income flow accruing to the agents in the course of the
bargaining. Then status quo payoﬀs can be interpreted as the disagree-
ment points. This bargaining game, however, may have many equilibria,
some of which are ineﬃcient (see Fernandez and Glazer (1991)).
9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: The lemma is proven for the case of i = 1, and
it is symmetric for the case j = 1. Let M∗ = max
φ1
∂B1 (a1, φ1) /∂a1
and m∗ = min
φ1
∂B1(a1, φ1)/∂a1. Then by definition ∂B1(a1, φ
c
1)/∂a1 ≤
M∗ and ∂B1(a1, φˆ1)/∂a1 ≥ m∗. We have assumed that 12M∗ < m∗.
One can find a suﬃciently small δ1 (a2) for each φc1 (a1, a2) such that
14For instance, Nucor as the producer and David J. Joseph Company as the supplier
of scrap as in Holmstrom and Roberts (1998).
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1
2
M∗ + δ1 (a2) < m∗. Then by substitution we obtain
1
2
∂B1(a1, φc1)/∂a1 + δ1 (a2) ≤ ∂B1(a1, φˆ1)/∂a1 (22)
that is for every a2, there exist a δ1 (a2) and a unique a1, such that,
where φc1 is the value of function φ evaluated at the cooperative choices.
Next define D (a1, a2) = C1 (a1, a2) − B1(a1, φˆ1). By 22, D (a1, a2)
is a monotonically decreasing function of a1 and a2 and D (0, a2) > 0.
RewritingB1(a1, φˆ1) asB1(a1, φˆ1) = B1(0, φˆ1)+
R a1
0
(∂B1(a1, φˆ1)/∂a1)da1
and substituting 22, we obtain B1(a1, φˆ1) ≥ B1(0, φˆ1)+
R a1
0
(∂C1 (a1, a2) /
∂a1 + δi (aj))da1. This can be rewritten as B1(a1, φˆ1) ≥ B1(0, φˆ1) −
C1 (0, a2)+C1 (a1, a2)+ δi (aj) a1. If B1(0, φˆ1)−C1 (0, a2)+ δi (aj) a1 > 0
then B1(a1, φˆ1) > C1 (a1, a2) . Thus there exists an aH1 > (B1(0, φˆ1) −
C1 (0, a2))/δ, such that, D(aH1 , a2) < 0. Using the intermediate value
theorem, there exists a point a∗i ∈
£
o, aH1
¤
such that D(a∗1, a2) = 0. It is
unique since D(a1, a2) is monotonically decreasing for all ai ∈ Ai.
Having shown the existence of a unique a∗i for all a2, define a function
α1 : A2 → A1 such that
B1(α1 (a2) , φˆ1) = C1 (α1 (a2) , a2) (23)
By condition 22, ∂C1 (a1, a2) /∂a1 − ∂B1(a1, φˆ1)/∂a1 6= 0, hence the im-
plicit function theorem can be applied. Diﬀerentiating both sides of 23
with respect to a2 we obtain ∂α1 (a2) /∂a2 > 0.
The existence of α2 (a1) can be shown in a similar manner. Since it
is a monotonic function, its inverse, α−12 (a2), is a well defined function.
By definition, D (α1 (a2) , a2) > 0 if a1 > α1 (a2), hence agent 1 maxi-
mizes B1(a1, φˆ1) − v1 (a1). For a1 < α1 (a2), agent 1’s outside option is
not binding and for a1 > α
−1
2 (a2), agent 2’s outside option is also not
binding. Thus, agent 1 receives C1 (a1, a2)− v1 (a1). For a1 ≤ α
−1
2 (a2),
agent 2’s outside option binds, therefore agent 1 claims the residual and
receives H1 (a1, a2)− v1 (a1).
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